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In the Stt preIDe Court of the
State of Utah

FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N. A., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respoodent,

vs.

CASE
NO. 9926

EDWARD H. BATES,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

Plaintiff seeks to annul and set aside a deed on the
basis that there was no present, absolute and nnconditional
delivery of the deed to the grantee during the grantor's
lifetime; and that the deed was testamentary in character
and, therefore, inoperative because it was not executed in
accordance with the Statute of Wills.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The case was tried to the Court. FTom a judgment
by the District Court in favor of the plaintiff, defendant
appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Although there is no dispute as to the facts elicited
at trial, nevertheless, the appellant's Statement of Fact
does nort completely and correctly state those facts. For
that reason the respondent feels compelled to set forth
some importnt facts not stated by the appellant. In order
to keep the sequence straight and to eliminate the necessity of ;referring from the appellant's brief to the respondent's brief in order to determine what the facts are, the re~
spondent will therefore restate the facts.
Willis Bates, the decedent, was an old friend of Thelma Vest Smurthwaite, then known as Thelma Vest. For
the purpose of this fact statement, Mrs. Smurthwaite will
be referred to as Thelma Vest throughout the recitation.
Miss Vest 'had known Willis Bates for ten years prior to
January, 1949, and referred to him as a dear friend of
the family (R. 60-61). Mr. Bates was a bachelor and took
his meals at the Vest Restaurant in Payson, eating there
in the presence of Miss Vest three times a day. Prior to
January, 1951, Miss Vest was a school teacher, however,
in November of 1950 she was elected Utah COunty Recorder and is presently Utah County Recorder (R. 59). Thelma Vest was a Notary Public in January of 1949. On
Januacy 14, 1949, Willis Bates was a masonry contractor.
He., at that time, owned the home in question in Payson,
Utah, many items of personal property, two autobobiles,
one touring car and a ton and a half truck.
On J.anuary 14, 1949, Mr. Bates, while at the restau-
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rant of the parents of Miss Vest, had a conversation with
Miss Vest. The substance of the conversation is set forth
as follows:
"A. Mr. Bates came to me and said, "Thelma, I have
received a telephone call from California offering me
employment." And, he said, "I have always wanted
to get out of this cold weather." He said, "It is pleasant weather down there and good working conditions,
and so I am leaving immediately." He said, "I am
hesitant about going." He said, "I hate to leave my
home." He had just built a little new home. He said,
"If anything happens to me, I would want my brother
Ted to have the home." He said, "We are in a spot
in Payson right now, there is no attorney here". He
said," Mr. McMullin has died". Mr. Hodgson at that
time had not come to town. Mr. R. A. Porter had
gone and left to make a livelihood somewhere else.
He said, "Could you help me?" I said, "I am Notary
Public". He said, "Could you help me make the deed
in the event that anything happened to me that Ted
could have my home". He said, "I have done much
for Lewis, who is the Principal of the High School".
He said, "I educated Walter". He said, "I have never
done much for Ted and he is the baby of the family''.
He said, "I have always felt compassionate towards
Ted and I have always felt that I would like to do
more for him if I ever was in a position to do it". He
said, ''He is married and has had kind of a rough time.''
So he said, "If you will help me with this, I will appreciate it". He said, "Then if you would hold this
for me, I will appreciate that too". He said, "In the
event anything ,happens to me, you give it to Ted, but
I don't want Ted to know that you 'have this document
unless something happens to me." He said, "That is
just our secret."
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I said, "Willis, I will be glad to help you". It was
all on the spur of the moment this evening and he was
going to leave the next morning or by midnight to
drive to the coast to immediately get ready to accept
the appointment by the first of the week, and it was
all a suddenness at that time."

Miss Vest prepared the deed to the house and she also
prepared, at the decedent's request, a bill of sale to one
Oldsmobile touring ear, one Chevrolet ton and a half truck,
and to all personal property belonging to the decedent (Exhibit 2.).
One of the documents prepared by Miss Vest for the
decedent on January 14, 1949, which is not in evidence
and was apparently destro~ed after the death of the decedent, was a power of attorney. Miss Vest testified that
the purpose of this instrument was as follows:
"A. Yes, there was a bill of sale and a power of attorney so that if anything happened to him, that I
could get the papers and tell Ted aJbout it, it was crudely drawn up. It was to tell Ted where the keys to
the safety deposit box were so Ted could get the keys
and get what he might have there."

After January 14, 1949, the decedent sold the Oldsmobile referred to in the bill of sale and purchased a 1958
Cadillac (R. 98). The decedent further retained possession of all of his other personal property, occupied the
premises, and paid taxes thereon from the date the documents were made until his death on January 21, 1962.
In September of 1956 the first wife of the defendant
died. In 1960 he remarried and was later divorced.
On two occasions Miss Vest left the State and returned
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the documents to the decedent with comments, the substance of which are as follows:
"Willis, I am going away. I would not want to take
this with me. Perhaps if I leave them they will get
destroyed. I thnik you better take care of these until
I return.''
In 1960 when the decedent learned that Edward had
married he came to Miss Vest and had a conversation in
the restaurant again:
"A. Yes, he said, "Thelma". I said, "Yes". He said,
'Are you busy?" I said, 'Not too busy". He said,
"Could I talk to you?" He said, "I am quite concerned
over this marriage of Ted's". I said, "Yes, I heard
Ted got married''. He said, You know, I thought about
the deeds. I want Ted and those children to have that
home, but", he said, "I would not want that woman
or any of her kin or her family to have one sand of
one brick of any part of that place". He said, "It is
for Ted and those motherless children". I said, "Willis, you know, if you feel that way, I think it might
be a good idea for you to go around the comer and
have Mr. Hodgson, he is just around the comer from
where you live, the attorney-at-law, and it is very convenient. If I were you, I would go and have him draw
you up a letter as to what you would like done". He
said, "Well, I have been awful upset over this". He
said, "'If anything happens to me," he said, "I would
want Ted to record the deed and then I would want
the children to have the home". So, I just passed it
off at that time after I mentioned it might be well
for him to go and talk to Mr. Hodgson.''

Sometime later he had another conversation with Miss
Vest which apparently took place at the same location but
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after the divorce between the defendant and his wife. The
conversation was as follows:
"Finally, one day I saw him and he said, "I feel bette·r". HJe said, "Ted is getting a divorce from the woman, do you know that?" I said, "No I don't". He
said, "Thank the Lord he is not going to live with her,
he has seen the light". I had nothing against the woman myself, so far as that is concerned. It is their
business and I knew her and I knew her family. They
are fine people but, he said, "I am glad he is getting
a divorce". So he said, "I am ·happy about it". He
said, "We will leave things like they are, I feel relieved" * * * (R. 68).

Matters remained fairly constant from 1960 to January of 1962, at which time Mr. Willis Bates went to the
hospital for an operation. .Apparently he did not believe
he was going to die, but nevertheless wanted to have a
conversation with Miss Vest (then Mrs. Smurthwaite) concerning the deed. The conversation was as follows:

"A. He said, "Thelma, I am glad to see you and I
am glad you came''. He said, ''You know how I feel
about my ·home', and I said, "Yes, Willis, I do". He
said, "I want Ted to record the deed when I am gone''.
He said, ''I want you to deliver the deed to Ted and
I want Ted, if he has not severed 1his relationships with
Dora or this woman, I want you to have Ted make a
deed to those motherless children". I said, "Are you
sure they are 1completely divorced?" He said, "Ted
tells me ~he is". He said, "One never knows." He
said, "The home is for Ted and his kids", and he also
said at the same time, I was crying, I was quite touched.
I said, "You are not going to die, Willis, what is the
matter, you should not take such a negative attitude".
He said, "Of course I am not, but one needs to be pre-
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pared. U one has desires and wishes, he likes to see
then1 carried out". He said, "I have that faith and
confidence and trust in you". He said, "Of course,
I have a job that I have got to go to". And, he said,
"I have to get well". And he said, "They are going
to open me up right here". (indicated) He said, "It
is the same thing that Lewis and Walter had". He
said, "It is going to rupture if I go on". He said, "This

is a simple operation, there is nothing to worry about''.
He said, "They are putting a plastic tube in here (indicated.) , and I will be as good as new". I said, "You
mean you are going on construction with a plastic tube
in you?" He said, "Heavens yes, I will be ready to
a lot of things by then". I said, "In March?" He
said, I will be down on the lake catching catfish and
bass". He said,
I will be down there with Bert one of these days'',
and we laughed about that." * * * (R. 69)
"Q. Did he say anything about making a deed
from Ted to the chHdTen?
A. Yes, ·he said that he would like Ted to make
a deed to Rose Mary. He said, "Rose Mary is not
well". He said, "If it takes every penny that I have
left, I want that little girl made well, if it takes every
penny I ·have left.''
Q. What did he say about making the deed to
Rose Mary?
A. He said, "I would like Ted to record the deed
and make a deed to Rose Mary and Joe, Ted's motherless children".
Q. Did he say for you to see that be did so?
A. He told me to instruct Ted to that effect.
Q. Didn't ·he say anything about it to this ef-

fect, "You promise me or see that ·he does that?"
A. He said, "I want you to see that Ted makes
a deed, you will give the deed to Ted and then tell
Ted I want him to make a deed to the kids''.
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Q. You weren't to give the deed to him unless
you got assurance that he did so or made a deed from
him to the children?
A. I was to give the deed to Ted and have him
record it and then make a deed to the children."

The facts stated above are the sequence of the conversation between the decedent and Miss Vest, however,
Miss Vest, throughout the transcript, made orther statements as to what was said at the time the various conversations related a~bove took place.
For example, referring to the time when the defendant had
remarried, counsel for the plaintiff asked Miss Vest as
follovvs:
"Q. He wanted to change the deed when Ted remarried?
A. He mentioned to me the fact that he wanted
the deed made to the children when Ted remarried.
He still wanted Ted and his children to have the home.
Q. He wanted it to go to Ted's children when he
remarried?
A. Yes." (R. 72)

In referring to the conversation in the Veterans Hospital, Miss Vest testified as follows:
"Q. He wanted Ted's children to have this place,
did he not?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was his last wish?
A. Yes, that Ted's children have the place especially the one that was an invalid, I shouldn't say
invalid, she is not an invalid, she is ill. She had a
nervous breakdown, but she is better now."
Q. And at that time he w·anted her to have it
because of her illness.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

A.

Not her alone.
Q. Well who?
"A. He wanted the children, she and the boy to
have the home, never the girl alone. He made the
statement, "If it took every penny that I ·have, I would
like to see the little girl made well". Ted's wife died
from cancer, just a very slow edging death and it was
terrible on Ted and on her and her family.'' (R. 73)
The Court was concerned about the relationship between the decedent and Miss Vest. Testimony concerning
whether she was escrow holder for the grantee of the deed
and bill of sale, or whether she was merely custodian for
safe keeping and an agent of the grantor, was elicited from
Miss Vest. Her testimony in this respect was as follows:
You gave them back to him and he could
have kept them?
"Q.
A.

Yes.

You didn't call him up and tell 'him to bring
the papers back?
A. No, several times I felt like giving them back,
they were quite a concern at times. I ·worried about
them sometimes, but then I felt like he trusted the
papers with me.
Q. If he had asked for them at any time, he
could have had them?
A. I would have ·handed them to him if he ;had
wanted to keep them.
Q. You would have given them to ~him at any
time?
A. You bet, I would have been glad to give them
to him if he had wanted them. I felt that he had confidence and trust and faith in me and wanted me to
keep the papers.
Q. You understood that if he had wanted them
back, he could have had them back?
Q.
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A.
Q.
A.
papers."

Yes definitely.
Did he understand that to your knowledge?
Oh yes, he must have done, those were his
(R. 75)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE VALIDITY OF
A DEED NOT IN THiE POSSESSION O·F THE GRANTEE AT THE DEATH O·F THE GRANTO·R IS UPON
THE CO·NTESTANT.

The appellant ·has cited the case of Chamberlain v.
Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P.2d 355, as authority for the
proposition that the burden of proving non-delivery is upon the plaintiff. Under the circumstances of the Chamberlain case, the respondent would not dispute that statement of law. The Chamberlain case, however, is not in
point fr.om a f,actual standpoint. In the Chamberlain case,
there had been a delivery to the grantee prior to death.
The grantor and the grantee, in the Chamberlain case, were
both elderly sisters who resided together. In that case,
both the grantor and the grantee went to a Mr. Fletcher,
a Notary Public, and the grantor requested him to make
1ih.e deed in question. The grantor did most of the talking
and stated, in the presence of the grantee, that she wanted
the grantee to have the property. The grantor and the
grantee ~had a safety deposit box in their joint name at
Zions Savings Bank and Trust Company. When the deed
was made it was placed by the grantor in the joint safety
deposit box of the grantor and gmntee. Mter the death
of the grantor it was taken by the grantee and recorded.
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In that case the statement of the court that the burden
of proving non-delivery was upon the plaintiff since the
grantee had possession of the deed, both before and after
the death of the grantor.
The law is different, however, where the grantee does
not have possession of the deed at the death of the grantor. The rule in that instance is the opposite. That rule
is expressed in the case of Alexander vs. American Bible
Society, et al., 94 NE 2d 833. The facts in that case are
as follows:
William H. Mason and Annie M. Mason were the owners of certain property. Both ·were 88 and 92 years of age
respectively. On February 5, 1945, they executed two
warranty deeds, one conveying to the American Bible Society the West half of the land in Section 29, and the other conveying to Blackburn University the six acre tract
in Section 22. After making the deed they delivered the
deeds to Russell Younger, who testified that in the month
of February, 1945, he called at the Mason ·home at the
request of Mr. Mason, who in the presence of Mrs. Mason, handed him the two envelopes and at that time Mr.
Mason stated in substance:
"Here is two envelopes. The instructions are written on the outside and when we die you follow the
in...~ctions on the envelopes."
He further testified that except for the instructions
on the back of the envelopes containing the deeds he never
at any time received any other directions or instructions
from either Mr. or Mrs. Mason concerning the deeds and
that after delivery to him of the envelopes, Mr. Mason nor
his wife ever mentioned the matter to him. Younger tes-
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tified that he placed the envelopes containing the deeds
in one of the drawers in the vault of the Shelby Loan and
Trust Company. He was an officer of Shelby Loan and
Trust Company, and that the deeds remained there until
after the death of Mr. and Mrs. Mason and that this drawer where the deeds were kept was not accessable to anyone other than the officers and emplo~ees of the bank.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Mr. and Mrs. Mason, in depositing the
envelopes containing the deeds with Younger established
an intent to place the deeds beyond recall or control and
with a present intent to immediately convey a future interest in the lands.
HELD:

It appears that after Younger received the envelopes
containing the deeds they were never in the possession of
the grantors and that they never could have obtained possession thereof without obtaining at least the permission
of Younger or some orther officer or employee of the bank,
since the grantors did not have access to the vault in which
the deeds were held.
"Where a deed is merely left with a third person for
safekeeping, to be taken care of, and the grantor has
the power of recall, the deed has not been legally de-livered even thot1g1h the deed remains with the third
person until after the grantor's death and is then recorded. (Authorities) Likewise, if the grantor delivers the deed to a third party without any direction
as to delivery to the grantee, the deed is invalid. (Authorities) If the grantor merely places the deed in
the hands of a third person for safekeeping or as a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
convenient place for deposit, the deed is not validly
delivered and conveys no title. (Authorities)."
"ln&~rnu<·h

as the deeds were not in the possession of
the grantees at the time of grantor's death, the burden then fell upon the grantees to prove that the grantc.rs had made an effectual legal delivery of the deeds
beyond their possession, control and dominion and
without the right to recall the same o;r change the disposition thereof."
(Emphasis added)

"While the intention of the grantors in the case at bar
is meritorious and one would expect that because of
their previous experiences in life they would desire
that organizations such as the American Bible Society and Blackburn University would benefit from
their worldly possessions, the law has prescribed certain plain rules to be observed in the execution of documents by which the title to real property is transferred, and while in this case the intention of the parties may fail, the court cannot o~e long established
rules of law governing the transfer of real property
in this state, which have been established for the benefit of the public at large and the violation of which
would tend to render titles to real estate unstable and
uncertain."
"We hold that there was no proof that these deeds were
validly delivered during the lifetime of the grantors
and that the decree of the Circuit Court of Moultrie
County is erroneous. The decree is reversed and the
cause is remanded with directions to that Court to enter a decree in favor of the plamtiff, removing the
deeds as clouds upon her title and eonfuming the title
to said premises in her.''
See also 16 Am. Jur. 650, Sec. 372, part of which is
quoted as follows:
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''A party claiming under a deed is bound to prove its
execution and delivery, including its acceptance and
that the transaction was complete before the death
of the grantor.''
See also Supplement 16 Am. Jur. 650.
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF DID SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF
PROOF AND THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY
FACT AND BY LAW.

It is a well established point of law that the findings
of the trial court in respect to a fact situation will not be
reversed without a clear showing of abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial judge. If the trial cowt's decision
can be sustained on a factual point, it will be sustained by
the Supreme Court on review. Cases in support of this
position are as follows:
O'Gara v. Findlay, 6 U.2d 102, 306 Pac. 2d 1073:
"The main contention upon appeal is that there was no
valid delivery of the deed in question. In reviewing
this contention, we will keep in mind the fact that the
trial court found a valid delivery. Since this is true,
we will not overturn its decision unless it is manifest
that the trial court misapplied proven facts or made
findings clearly against the weight of the evidence."
Wolff v. Fallon (Ca. Dist. Ct. of Appeal) 269 Pac. 2d
630:
''It is well established that the ,right to relief from restrictive covenants such as those herein depends upon
the facts of each case. The findings of the trial cowt
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in such a case are entitled to the same weight as in
any other case, and if based on any substantial evidence, they are final.'' Strong v. Hlancock, 201 Cas.
530; 25R P. 60: Robertson v. Nichols, 92 Ca. App. 2d
201, 207; 206 P.2d 898.
Key v. McCabe, 356 P.2d 169:
"There is the sole question presented for determination:
Is there substantial evidence in the record to support
the findings of fact set forth above?
"Yes. The rules is established that when a finding of
fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any
substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as
to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact. (Primm v. Primm, 45 Cal. 2d 690, 293
(1), 299 P.2d 231.)"
In respect to this point, the respondent respectfully
states to the Court that there are numerous findings other
than the four recited on Page 7 of appellant's Brief upon
which the Court based its decision. Other facts that were
undoubtedly persuasive in this regard were as follows:
That at the time of executing the deed in question,
on January 14, 1949, Miss Vest prepared for the decedent
a bill of sale as to the decedent's automobile, and a power
of attorney to authorize the attorney to do certain things
for him. Decedent, after making the deed and bill of sale,
sold tile automobile, thereby evidencing that he did not intend ownership of the automobile to be transferred at the
date of the bill of sale, but that he intended to maintain
ownership and control over it. This docwnent was of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
same nature as the deed, except the deed was to real property and the bill of sale was to personaJ. property.
The intent of the decedent is clearly manifested by his
action in respect to the personal property. The Power of
l-\.ttorney, the deed and the bill of sale were nort to be delivered except upon the death of William Bates (R. 65.).
It appears the de€d was testameiJ.tary and there was no
delivery prior to death. The decedent kept eontrol of the
property and intended to, except upon condition of death.
FuTthermore, Miss Vest was not the escrow holder, but
was merely the custodian. (See Statement of Facts above).
(R. 75). It seems singularly important that she said, in
respect to the documents, including the deed, "Those were
his papers.' (R. 75). Miss Vest at no time looked at herself as an escrow holder, but merely as custodian for the
grantor. For that reason she could not have been anything more than the agent of the grantor and certainly
not the agent orf the grantee.
The appellant's strongest case in this argument is the
case of Lossee v. Jones, 235 P.2d 132. We believe that
case is clearly distinguished from the present case for a
number of reasons. The authorities indicate that the question of delivery is based upon a multitude of :circumstances.
In the Lossee case the decedent had left her own home and
went to the home of one of her daughters, who was one
of the grantees named in the. deeds in question in that suit.
The mother was 80 years of age. Prior to that time she
had maintained complete custody and control over the
deeds. When she delivered the deeds, she delivered the
deeds to one of the grantees. These are hardly the circumstances of the principal case, although the differences may
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be relatively small, they are, nevertheless, distinct and justify different conclusions.

The appellant cites the case of Burnham, et al. v. Eschler, 208 P.2d 96, as supporting this contention. Respondent believes this case is distinct from the principal case,
in that the grantor in the Burnham case delivered the deed
to L. R. Eschler, the husband of the grantee, who was the
agent, not of the grantor, but of the grantee. He, 'himself,
(L. R. ~chler) had a contingent interest in the property.
Mrs. Schank, the grantor, made several statements to several persons that she had deeded the property away; that
the property was owned by her niece, Leta, and that the
property "Had been taken care of." Furthermore, there
was a long history of gifts from the grantor to the grantee. The grantor had no children and the grantee was
raised as a child of the grantor. The grantor further stated that the reason she gave the deed to the husband of
the grantee was "she didn't want Leta to feel any personal obligation to her in her lifetime. The grantor never
attempted or considered changing the deed. The court
found, under those circumstances, that the grantor delivered the deed to Mrs. Eschler, the grantee, absolutely without reservation and without intending to reserve any control over the instrument. This is not the circumstance in
our case, where the grantor obviously exercised control
over the instrument, as indicated by his other conduct and
disposition of the property given in other instruments of
like import.
The court, in the Burnham vs. Eschler case, says this:
"If the grantor reserves control of rthe instrument ·and

it is subject during

~his

lifetime to revocation, no pres-
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ent estate passes to the grantee and the deed is invalid for want of delivery." (Authorities)

"No other intention than that of the deceased to divest herself absolutely of title when she handed the
deeds to Mr. Eschler can be reasonably deduced from
the evidence in the principal case.''
Respondent respectfully submits to the court that in
the case at issue, other intent can be reasoMbly deduced
from the evidence and, in fact, other intent preponderates
against the defendant.
The appellant cites as additional authority the case of
Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 Utah 236, 177 Pac. 763. 'Ibis
case also does not stand for the point for which the appellant cites it. In that case, at the time that the grantor
and the escrow holder arranged to transfer the property
without the consent of the grantees, both aclmowledged
that the property was not the grantor's nor the escrow
holder's, but was the property of the children. All during
this transaction Gappmayer, the original grantor, and Nelson, the original grantee., who eventually by-passed the
deeds of the children by deeding to the Wilkensons, told
Wilkenson that the property was the property of the minor
children and that he, in effect, held the property only as
escrow holder for the said children. The grantor furthermore never attempted to get the deeds back for his own
benefit and for his own urposes, but merely for the benefit of the minor children.

POINT ill
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE GRANTOR
NEVER DID INTEND A PRESENT, ABSOLUTE AND
UNCONDITIONAL DELIVERY OF THE DEED AT THE
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TIME: THAT HE GAVE IT TO MISS VEST AND JUDG-

1\IENT OF TI-IE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.
The appellant has broken his argwnent into three
points, however, the respondent believes that the issues
are relatively simple in this case and could be reduced to
the following questions:
1. Did the grantor intend a present, absolute and unconditional delivery of the deed to the grantee at the time
he gave the deed to Miss Vest?, and
Was the deed testamentary in character and, therefore, inoperative because not executed in accordance with
the Statute of Wills?
2.

Sin,ce the second question is necessarily determined
by the first question, the argwnent can properly be addressed to both issues at the same time. The test to be
applied in a case such as this is, did the grantor reserve
the right to recall the deed from the possession of rthe depositary? If he did, then there was no delivery and the
conveyance failed. The respondent has set forth facts in
his Statement of Facts which we believe clearly show that
there was not a present, absolute and ·unconditional grant
and that the grantor intended to keep possession of the
house and keep ownership of the personal property, except in the event of a contingency, t~wit: Death. The
facts stated above also show that Miss Vest did not consider herself a trustee or escrow agent of the grantee. She
felt, on the contrary, that she was the custodian and agent
of the grantor, and that she ~held only at his instance and

request.
The respondent believes that the rule in these cases
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is simple and is stated in the cases cited by the appellant
as well as in the cases cited by the respondent. The rule
is the same in all instances. That rule was enunciated

quite clearly in the Eschler case cited above by the appellant, the exact quotes from the case being cited by the
respondent, and by the illinois Court in the Alexander vs.
American Bible Society Case. The respondent is even impressed with the statement of the law cited by the appellant under Point III and especially in that portion of his
quotation set forth on Page 11 of appellant's brief as follwos:
"However, for either delivery to be effective to pass
title, the grantor must have surrendered all dominion
and control over the interest to be 'conveyed. If he
reserves a power to recall the deed, by word, act, or
writing, and regardless of whether he ever exercises
it or not, no delivery has resulted and no transfer occurs. (Citing Singleton vs. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212
Pac. 63).
The question, therefore, reduces itself to the application of the rule to the particular fact situation. Appellant has cited a number of cases where under the circumstances of those cases the court, in applying the rules set
forth aJbove, has concluded thaJt the deed was effootive.
The respondent respectfully urges this Court that in every
case cirted by the apellant there was a noteable and distinct
difference between the facts in that case and the one in
the instant case. The respondent, therefore, cites to the
Court cases wherein the deed was held ineffective for lack
of delivery and because it was testamentary in character,
and cases which the respondent believes are more analogous to the fact situations in ·the instant case.
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Pendleton v. Kelly, 212 P. 63, (a Utah case). In that
case, by separate writing, the grantor had manifested an
intent that the deed was not to be delivered except in the
event of his death, however, that he reserved the right to
withdraw or change the same dwing his life. The court
in that case held:
"The writing, together with the deed, even though the
deed was delivered, together with grantor's later conduct, proved that the grantor did not intend the deed
as absolute and unconditional. Therefore, the court
proprly set the deed aside. This is so even though reservation of a life estate in a deed raises a presumption of an intention on the part of the grantor to make
an immediate transfer.'' (Emphasis added)
In the case of First Security Bank of Utah, N. A. vs.

Burgey (A Utah Case), 251 Pac 2d 297, the Court said:
"Delivery is essentially a matter of intent, Such intent is to be arrived at from aU the facts and surrounding circumstances, both before and after the date of
the deed, including declarations of the alleged grantor where it appears the declarations are made fairly
and in the ordinary course of life. (Authorities) The
testimony reveals that the deceased clearly intended
that the deed and bill of sale pass the property to the
defendant. The facts and circumstances, however,
support the trial court's finding that the deceased had
no intention to pass title immediately, but that such
deed and bill of sale were to become operative upon
the death of the decedent. Under such circumstances
the deed and bill of sale were clarly testamentary in
character and intent and were inoperative since they
did not confonn to the statutory requirements for testamentary dispositions." In re Alexander's Estate,
104 Utah 286, 139 Pac 2d 432 (Emphasis added)
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The Oregon court, in the case of Marquart, et al. vs.
Dick-Executor, 310 P2d 742, considered this matter. A
brief summary of that case is as follows:
FACfS:

Prior to January 14, 1943, the Marquart Brothers,
John and Joseph, who had never married, owned four parcels of land. On January 14, 1943, they executed reciprocal deed to the land. They were executed in the office
of Frank G. Dick, an atto~ney, with oral instructions to
hoJd them until the death of one of the grantors, whereupon the deed to the survivor was to be placed on record.
John died intestate January 13, 1950. Up to that time
both brothers possessed the property. The deed to Joseph
was recorded. Joseph then made a will and left the property by will to the Shriners HOspital. Suit is brought by
heirs of John to set aside the deed.
ISSUE:

Was the deed from John to Joseph testamentary in
character, therefore, inoperative because not executed in
accordance with the Statute of Wills?
HELD:

"* * * The question as to when a deed executed and
deposited with a stranger, to be delivered to the grantee upon the death of the grantor, is effective to pass
title, has been subject of much judicial controversy;
but it is now substantially agreed that its solution depends on whether the grantor intends to and does retain dominion and control over it after such delivery,
or parts with the possession and control of it absolutely at the time of delivery. In the former case, by
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the great weight of authority-although the decisions
are not entirely harmonious - there is no sufficient
delivery, and the deed passes nothing. But if the
grantor parts with all dominion and conrol over the
deed, reserving no right to recall it or alter its provisions, it is a good delivery, and the grantee will, on
the death of the grantor, succeed to the title."
"• • • Therefore, the inquiry is simplified by asking,
did the grantor intend the property to pass? The intention is to be gathered from the words or acts, or
both, of the maker of the instrument and the surrounding circumstances.''
The deed was held invalid because of the ineffective
delivery.
This case also stands for the proposition that the grantor's intent at the time of making the deed can be determined from his after actions and conduct.
A case which the respondent believes is analogous to
the principal case is the case of Snodgrass vs. Snodgrass,
107 Okla. 140, 321 P. 237:
In that case the grantor executed two warranty deeds
by terms conveying them to each of two of his adult children, Minne E. Pierce and Joyce L. Snodgrass, a separate
tract of real estate subject to a reservation of a life
estate to himself. These he deposited with one Jay Collins, who was an abstractor and a loan agent, and not a
lawyer ,and who had drawn the papers for him. On May
22, 1915, the same grantor executed a similar deed to
Rachael Rice, his adult daughter, conveying to her another tract of real estate and depositing the same with
other papers with Mr. Collins. No instructions were given
to Mr. Collins in respect to holding these deeds. After the
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death of Mr. Snodgrass, Sr., an executor was appointed,
a Will was admitted to brobate which contained a provision that gave particular sums to residuary legatees. These
legatees had commenced an action against the executor
to compel him to bring an action to set aside the deeds on
the grounds that there was no effective delivery. The trial
court held in favor of the grantees of the deeds and this
court reversed the trial court. In reversing the trial court
it said:
''Where there is a question as to whether there has
been a delivery of a deed of conveyance, the real test
of the intention of the grantor, which intention may
be manifested by mere acts or by words, or both combined, and such acts and words and the circumstances relevant thereto are susceptable to parol proof."
Argument was made that the fact that he did not call
for the deeds but left them unchanged was evidence of his
intention to make an effective irrevocaJble delivery. The
court said:
"The question we have to decide is not whether he did
change the deeds, but whether in his lifetime there
remained in him the power to change them. We see
no logic in the statement that his failure to take up
or change the deeds is evidence that he intended to
part with con"Wol of the deeds when he left them on
deposit with Mr. Collins. Had these deeds been delivered to the grantees when executed or had it been
made clear to them at that time that these tracts of
real estate did, at rthe time of the execution of such
deeds, then become their very own to be of them
owned subject only to the life estate therein reserved,
why these grantees could have then and at all times
thereafter disposed of all of the land during the life-
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time of the grantor. All this, of course, the grantor
knew. Likewise, if the deeds had been delivered, then
if, during the years that intervened between the execution of the deeds and the grantor's death, one of
the grantees should have died, then the grantor could
not have changed the deed and the title to the land
would have passed into the probate proceeding of the
county court. Of course, apparently not to the liking of the grantor. * * * *"
Argument was made that he reserved a life estate,
which is evidence of a delivecy of the residuary estate. The
court held:
"Had the grantor, when he executed these deeds in
fact intended to reserve control over them in order
to ·properly meet unforseen contingencies and in order to make certain that the land would be unencumbered part of his estate when he should die and had
merely desired that the deeds, if unchanged by him
during his life, should merely have testamentary effect upon ·his death, what thing different would he
have done than what he did do in this case. * * * *
Presumptions and burden of proof are worthy of little
consideration here, because from all of the evidence
the ultimate conclusion to our mind and conscience
is irresistable that these deeds never passed beyond
the grantor's co~trol during his lifetime and were
never delivered and were not effective while the grantor lived.''
CoWlsel cited the case of Anderson v. Mauk, et al.,
67 P.2d 429, Oklahoma. This case comes from the same
jurisdiction as the Snodgrass case, however, the facts in
this case are considerably different and not authoritative
for the proposition for which they are cited by the ap-
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pellant. It is, however, interesting to norte the court also
said this in the Anderson case, which we believe is the rule
which should be applied to this case.
"It is equally well established that if the grantor intends at the time he makes a delivery to the third
person to retain the lawful right and power to revoke
or recall the instrument of conveyance, or to there..
after control the disposition o[ the same, the transaction constitutes nothing more than an ineffective at..
tempt to make a testamentary disposition of the property and the deed, not being executed in accordance
with the Statute of Wills, is ineffective and invalid
for that purpose. (Authorities)." (Emphasis added.)

The appellant also cites the case of Wilkerson v. Seib,
which apparently summarizes the California cases. This
case does not give the appellant any solace or comfort.
Tne case is found in the California Supreme Court as a
result of a dismissal o[ the plaintiff's complaint. The decision was based upon the allegations contained in the
complaint and the matter was remanded for further ~
ceedings, which we presume means trial. The most that
the Court says in this case is that if the allegations were
true, as sated in the complaint, there was a complete, !tOsolute and unconditional delivery of the deed to a third
party to ho~d in trust for the grantee. The trustee of the
deed :failed to turn it to the grantee upon the death of the
grantor and .the property was probated and sold to an inocent third party. The Court does nort conclude that the
deed per se is valid or invalid, but merely states that if
the allegations contained in the complaint are true it is a
basis for trial. This was a proper decision but not au-
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thority for the proposition for which the case is cited by
the appellant.
The respondent has traced the California cases submitted by the appellant and the California rule is not different than the Utah rule. It is merely the application of
the particular rule heretofore stated to the fact situation.
California cases can be found both sustaining and rejecting the deed.
For the benefit of the Court for comparison purposes;
the respondent submits the following case analogies:
Barnes, et al. vs. Spangler, 25 P.2d 732 (Colorado)
In this case the grantor, then being of 78 years of age, requested the grantee to come and make a home in his
premises, operate and manage the same, cook and care
for him, and then he, in return, would deed to her the
premises, which constituted apartments and were apparently of sizeable value. She did as he requested. The
Grantor, outside of the presence of the grantee, made ~and
executed a Warranty Deed to the premises to the grantee
and left the deed with the ~change National Bank of Colorado Springs, Colorado, with written instructions as follows:
''Colorado Springs, Colorado
"October 20, 1922
"The Exchage National Bank
"Colorado Springs, Colorado
"Gentlemen:
"I hand you herewith warranty deed dated October 20, 1922, given by me to Vera May Spangler
conveying residence property situate at 221 North
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Cascade, Colorado Springs, Colorado, which I shall
ask you to aocept for safekeeping and deliver
to Miss Vera M. Spangler in the event of my
death.
"Yours very truly,
"James S. Willard."
"Dhereafter, on September 21. 1927, the day following
Willard's death, the bank delivered the said deed to the.
defendant, who on said date filed the same for record. The
trial court entered a finding in this case that the said James
S. Willard, the grantor, constituted the bank as trustee
for the defendant and intended to reserve no control or
dominion over the said deed and to divest himself o[ title
and did, in fact, and in law, reserve no contr.ol or dominion
over the said deed and intended to and did convey title to
the defendant in praesenti. Upon appeal the Court said:
"The test in this case, as in all others where delivery
is to a third person, is: Did grantor, at the time of
alleged delivery to bank, intend to part with control
and make present grant of title without reserving right
to revoke or recall the deed?"
"A careful reading of the instructions which accompanied the handing of the deed to the depositary dispels any doubt in the writer's mind as to Willard's
intentions. They were made clear by the instructions.
He intended delivery to be made after his death and
said so. Under this writing the bank was Willard's
agent and possession of the bank and depositary was
the possession of Willard and the bank could have delivered the deed to Willard at any time before his
death without liability to defendant and Willard could

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
have destroyed it without liability to defendant. The
instrument could not operate as an escrow on accow1t
of the lack of sufficient parties and consideration, and
also the failure to actually contract. It is an indispensible feature of each delivery of a deed that grantor part with possession and control of any power
over it for the benefit of grantee ·and the grantor's act
or word must be such as to deprive him of all authority or the right to recall, and must evidence an
intention to part presently and unconditionally with
the deed; otherwise there is no delivery.''
''The facts do not justify the findings of the trial court
that there was a legal delivery. Consequently, the
conveyance attacked by plaintiff in this case is void
and ineffective and should be set aside. This court,
on several occasions, determined this question and especially in Childers vs. Baird, 59 Colorado 382, 148
P. 854; Harrison vs. Taylor, 83 Colorado 430, 266 P.
217; Griffiths vs. Sands, 84 Colorado 456, 271 P. 191;
and the law books present such unanimity of opinion
that it is useless to make further discussion."
This ·case and

~the

citations cited by the Supreme Court
of Colorado would seem to be completely opposed to the
defendant's categoric statement that there are no cases
to support the position of the plaintiff.
Compare the language in the written instructions in
the Barnes case with the oral instructions in the Bates case
and you will find that they are practically identical. In
the Bates case he said "In the event anything happens
to me, you give it to Ted, but I don't want Ted to know
that you have this instrument, unless something happens
to me.'' (R. 62). 'r.he deed was not to be delivered until
he died (R. 66). Miss Vest, on two occasions, retwned the
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instrument saying: "Willis, I am going away. I would not
want to take this with me. Perhaps if I leave them they
will get destroyed. I think you better take care of them
until I return". He would always bring them back to me
when I returned. He felt I was custodian of the papers."
( R. 63) . The evidence clearly shows that Miss Vest merely was taking care of the papers for safekeeping and not
as agent fc~ the grantee or as escrow holder. The only
difference between the oral instructions here and the written instructions in the Barnes case, is that the wor.d "safekeeping'' was not used in the oral instructions to Miss Vest,
however, all of the statements surrounding the keeping of
these papers by Miss Vest indicates it was for safekeeping and for and on behalf of the grantor (R. 75). He
could have had them back at any time for "those were his
papers.'' This evidence is unrebutted and unrefuted and conclusively shows that between Miss Vest and Mr. Bates the
papers were his papers and were not delivered for any
purpose to constitute an absolute grant or unconditional
delivery.
Another case whi·oh supports the position of the plaintiff herein is the case of Latshaw vs. Latshaw, et al., 107
N.E. 111 (Illinois). In this case Mary J. Latshaw and her
daughter, Mary, one ill the plaintiffs herein, went to the
office of James Marley, who was the circuit clerk and recorder of Edgar County, for the purpose of having a deed
prepared conveying the land in controversy to the plaintiffs (two daughters). Marley was a close personal friend
of the grantor. Marley had the deed prepared, Mrs. Mary
J. Latshaw executed the deed and handed it to Marley
with instructions to keep the deed for her and not to re-
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cord it until after her death. One of the grantees named
in the deed, ·her daughter, Mary, was present during this
transaction. There was evidence that Mary gave her
mother $1.00 or other consideration for the said deed, however, subsequent to the execution of the deed, Mrs. Latshaw requested Mr. Marley to deliver the deed to Mrs.
Tom Davis, which he did. Apparently the deed was thereafter delivered to the grantor and apparently destroyed.
The question is whether the transaction constituted a delivery. The deed purported to be an absolute conveyance
of the fee simple title without restrictions or limitations.
The Court found that there was no valid delivery of the
deed:
"The evidence seems to warrant the conclusion that
it was the intention of the grantor to retain control
of the deed and the premises until her death for the
purpose of enabling her, in case she should desire, to
make a different disposition of the property to do so
without consulting anyone else. At the time she
signed the deed she manifestly intended that the grantees should have the land at her death, but she reserved the right to change her mind, which she did, as
is evidenced by ~her persistent efforts to repossess
herself of the deed and its destruction after it came
into her hands."
The only difference between this case and the Bates
case is that ·here the grantor actually received the deed
back and destroyed it, whereas in the Bates case he did

not, however, he could have and, therefore, the deeds stand
in identically the same position. Furthermore, the Bates
case is strengthened by the nature of the transaction and
the fact that the grantee never knew that he was 1Jhe gran-
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tee of the said instrument and never assented to the same
prior to the death of the grantor. Furthermore, the instructions in the Bates case and the subsequent conduct
of Bates gives little doubt that Bates intended to exercise
and maintain controJ of the said instrument.
In the case of Linn, et al. vs. Linn, ert al. (Illinois),
104 N.E. 229, the facts were these:
The grantor owned a sizeable amount of ground in
the states of Illinois and Nebraska. He contacted one R.
W. Aimes, who was a minister of the gospel, concerning
the preparation of instruments to convey the same to his
children and inquired of Mr. Aimes how to best accomplish his purpose. Mr. Aimes suggested that deeds be made
and that the~ be placed in escrow for the purposes of the
grantor. At the time o[ making the inquiry of Mr. Aimes
the gvantor, James Ht Linn, asked if it would be possible
to withdvaw the deeds if he later changed his mind and
Mr. Aimes stated that he thought it would be possible. Mr.
Linn thereafter had the deeds made and took them to
John C. Culbertson, a banker. The deeds were delivered
in this form: The deed to each grantee was p~aced in a
separate envelope numbered from one 1Jo six on each envelope and on each envelope was endorsed: "James H.
Linn. ']}his envelope not to be opened during my life." At
the same time the deeds were prepared the witness prepared a list or paper containing the names of the respective grantees and a description of the land 1contained in
the deed to each grantee and these descriptions were numbered from one to six to correspond with the numbers on
the envelopes containing the deeds. This list the witness
called "1Jhe escrow of the deeds." .It showed who the grantees were and the description of the land conveyed in the
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deed in each of the envelopes. No further instructions
were given to Culbertson, the banker. Shortly before the
death of Mr. Linn and while he was laying on his deathbed, he directed one of the grantees to a drawer in a bureau in the room where he would find some keys and told
the grantee to take the keys and go upstairs to the drawer
named and get a paper, which the father said was a list
of the deeds he had made. This list was apparently the
same list that he had previously designated as "the escrow of the deeds." The witness testified that his father
said "When I am dead take them back to Culbertson and
present them and get your deeds and take them to Pontiac and have them recorded and that will settle it." The
witness testified he went upstairs but could not find the
paper so he brought the drawer and its contents down to
his father and 'his father took the list out and handed it
to him. This act was, it was 1claimed, intended to be a
symbolic delivery of the deeds. The Court made the following finding:
''The following propositions have been settled by repeated decisions of this Court: A deed delivered by
a grantor to a third person for delivery to the grantee upon the grantor's death may be a valid conveyance, but it is indispensi:ble in such cases to the validity of the conveyance that the deed, when delivered
to the third party, shall pass absolutely beyond the
dominion and control of the grantor. If there is any
reservation of control of the deed by the grantor, if
he merely places it in the hands of a third person as
a convenient PLACE of deposit, still intending to retain control OVER it himself-it is not a valid delivery and conveys no title. So long as the deed in the
hands of the depositary is subject to recall by the
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grantor, the grantee acquires no right under it and
if the grantor dies without parting with control over
the deed, no one has authority afterwards to deliver

it to the grantee. The circumstances of the delivery
to the depositary must clearly show the grantor intended the deed to presently become operative. It
must take effect upon execution and delivery, if at all.
The intention of the grantor may be evidenced by
words or by acts, or by barth words and acts, but however shown it must appear that no control of the deed
was reserved or intended to be reserved by the grantor after delivering it to the depositary. (Numerous
citations)." (Emphasis Added)

"'I'here can be no doubt from the testimony that James
H. Linn intended that if he died without withdrawing
the deeds from Culbertson's possession and disposing
of the land, it should go to the grantees in the deeds,
but this intention could not prevail if he retained any
dominion or control orver the deeds and intended to
reserve the right to make any otheT disposition of
the land he saw fit to make during rhis lifetime. Such
an intended disposition of property is ambulatory until the death of the grantor and can only be affected
by an instrument in writing in conformity with the
Statute for the disposition of real estate by Will.
(Authorities) * * * *.''
The ·Court found that the delivery of the deed was
ineffective to pass title.

The plaintiff believes that there is a case that is identical from a fact standpoint with the instant case. That
is the case of Rhines vs. Young, a Washington case, found
in 166 P. 642. Inasmuch as that case is so similar to the
instant case from every standpomt, it is set out ·herein
verbatim:
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''The plaintiff, Oma Rhines, seeks recovery of
poosession of certain real property in the City of Tacoma from the defendants, William B. Young and others, and also to be adjudged the owner thereof as
against the claims of the defendants. Trial in the ~u
perior Court for Pierce COWlty resulted in findings
and judgment in favor of the defendants, from which
the plaintiff has appealed to this court.
On November 19, 1949, Mrs. Anna Farrell, the
grandmother of appellant, was the owner in her own
right as her separate property of the real property
here in question. On that day she caused to be prepared by ~her attorney, Mr. C. M. Riddell, a deed absolute in forn1 purporting to ·convey the property to
appellant. This deed was then signed and acknowledged by her and left with Mr. Riddell with instructions, as he claims to ·have understood her, to deliver
it to appellant upon the death of Anna Farrell and
when satisfactory proof should be furnished him of
her death. In November, 1912, Mrs. Farrell went to
Mr. Riddell and procured the deed from him. He
then voluntarily gave it to her. This was done under
such cirownstances as to strongly indicate that both
of them regarded the deed as being at all times in his
possession merely as her agent and at all times under
her dominion and control without any right or duty
on his part to hold the same for the exclusive benefit
of appellant. Mr. Riddell thereafter became of the
opinion that he had mistaken his duty in surrendering the deed to Mrs. Farrell. Reflecting upon the circumstances under which the deed was signed, acknowledged, and left with him as he remembered them,
he became of the opinion that the deed had been delivered to him by Mrs. Farrell with intent on her part
to surrender all dominion and control over it and with
the vie\v of then vesting title to the property in appel1
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lant, though it was not to be delivered by him to appeUant until after the death of Mrs. Farrell. Neither
the deed nor the property has ever been in the actual
or constructive possession of appeHant; Mrs. Farrell
remaining in possssion of barth the deed and the property until the time of her death. Mr. Riddell has
never been in any sense the agent or attorney for appellant, unless he was irrevocably made by such by
receiving the deed from Mrs. Farrell under such circumstances that it can be held she then surrendered
all dominion and control oveJ:" it. Mrs. Farrell died intestate at Tacoma in Maroh, 1913. Thereafter William B. Young, hell" son and heir, became the duly appointed and qualified administrator of her estate. Respondent, Martha Young, is the daughter and the only other heir of Mrs. Farren, ·and the orther respondents ·have acquired an interest in the property as grantees of William B. Young. The property has been
since the death of lVIrs. Farrell in the possession of
William B. Young, subject to the interests of the other
respondents. ~his action was commenced in May,
1914r resulting in denial of the relief prayed for by
appellant as above noticed.
Mr. Riddell is the only witness who testified as
to what was said and done by Mrs. Farrell at rthe time
the deed was signed, acknowledged, and left with him
by her. Indeed, he appears to be the only living witness of what then occurred, he being the notary before whom Mrs. Farrell acknowledged the deed, and
also the only witness to the deed signing as such.
While 1Jhe evidence seems to justify the belief that Mr.
Riddell honestly believed that he had mistaken his
duty in surrendering the deed to Mrs. Farrell during
·her lifetime, and honestly became of the opinion that
it was left with him by Mrs. Farrell with a view of
then surrendering all dominion and control over it and
1
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having it delivered after her death to appellant, we
feel constrained to conclude as the trial judge did that
Mrs. Farrell did not intend to surrender dominion and
control over the deed by leaving it with Mr. Riddell,
but left it with him, as she believed, solely as her
agent with the right on her part at all times exercising dominion and control over it. The testimony
given upon the trial touching the question of Mrs.
Farrell's intention at the time of leaving the deed with
Mr. Riddell is quite voluminous and much of it in important particulars in serious conflict. A careful reading of the evidence, however, convinces us, as it did
the trial judge, that Mrs. Farrell at the time of signing and acknowledging the deed and leaving it with
Mr. Riddell and at all times thereafter labored under
the belief that she had by its signing and acknowledgment in effect made a testamentary disposition of 'her
property and not an absolute ·conveyance thereof. We
deem it unnecessary to review the evidence in detail
here.
In view of our conclusion touching the question
of fact as to the intent of Mrs. Farrell in leaving the
deed with Mr. Riddell, the law of the case seems plain.
No claim is here made that the signing and acknowledgment of the deed and the leaving of it with Mr. Riddell constituted a valid testamentary disposition of the
property therein described. Indeed no such claim
could be successfully made in view of the provisions
of Section 1320, Rem. Code, prescribing the ·manner
of making wills in this state. It seems equally plain
that the signing, acknowledging, and leaving with Mr.
Riddell of the deed by Mrs. Farrell was not an effectual conveyance of the property, because of the
fact that it was not delivered in the sense that Mrs.
Farrell surrendered dominion and control over it. It
seems to be well settled law that, while a deed may
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become effectual to divest an owner executing it of
title to the property described therein, by delivering
it to a third person to be delivered to the grantee after the death of the owner, such delivery by the owner
to a third person must be such that it becomes absolute and beyond recall by the orwner. Otherwise there
is in law no delivery o[ the deed to render it effectual
as such. The rule is stated in 8 R. ~- L. 996, as follows:
''']}he rule sustained by the great weight of authority is that the grantor must not only deliver the
deed to a third person for the benefit of the grantee ultimately, and in some way express his intention to that effect, but must also part both with
the possession of the deed and with all dominion
an d oontroJ o¥er it.''
~our

own decisions are in harmony with this

rule. Meik,le vs. Cloquet, 44 Wash. 513, 87 Pac. 841;
Maxwell vs. Harer, 51 Wash. 351, 356, 98 Pac. 756.
See note to Munro v. Bowles, 54 L.R.A. 872.

We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the
law of the case. The real question here involved is,
in the last analysis, one of fact, to-wit: What was the
intention of Mrs. Farrell in signing, acknowledging,
and leaving the deed with Mr. Ridell?
The judgment is affirmed.''

If the appellant's argument is soW1d, then on January 15, 1949, Edward H. Bates, the grantee of the instrument, ·could have mortgaged the house, could 'have sold
the property, could have possessed the automobiles and
personal property and disposed of them, could have exercised all rights that an owner could exercise in the prop-
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erty. By analyzing the transaction from the standpoint of
&hvard fl. Bates and his claim of absolute ownership of
the property from January 14, 1949, it seems incongruous
and unbelievable that such contention could seriously be
made in light of the circumstances sUITotmding the execution of this deed and the maintenance, ~control and posses.4i;iO.:l of the property by the grantor. It is, by the same
token, just as obvious that the deed, power of attorney
and bill of sale were an attempt 1by the grantor to make
a testa1nentary disposition aided by inexpert counsel. Although the grantor's intention may have been meritorious,
as the lllinois Court stated above, the law has prescribed
the rule by which documents of this sort must be executed, which rule, if ignored, would render titles to real estate unstable. If appellant's contention is sound, any deed
executed by any grantor and delivered to any third party
is a valid, subsisting and legal deed, unless the grantor
writes a letter contemporaneously with the execution and
delivery of the deed, stating that he reserves a right to
revoke the deed.
CONCLUSION

The respondent respectfully urges the Court to sustain the judgment of the trial court. The respondent respectfully contends that the rule of law applicable to all
cases cited by both appellant and respondent is the same
and that the question of whether there is an effective inter
vivos delivery depends upon the particular facts in each
case. Respondent respectfully reiterates that the facts of
this case conclusively show that the grantor, Willis Bates,
did not intend a present, absolute and unconditional delivery of the deed to the grantee at the time he gave the deed
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to Miss Vest, and furthermore, that the deed was testamentary in character and, therefore, inoperative because
not executed in accordance with the Statute of Wills.
Respectfully submitted,
Jackson B. Howard, for:
HO,WARD AND LEWIS
Attorneys for Respondent
290 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah
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